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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
Economic modernity ,  socials tabi l ity  and legal  tension
Whereas the concept of “socialist rule of law” (she-hui zhuyi fazhi guojia 社会主义法治国家)((2) punctuated political discourse in
the late 1990s, it is the idea of a “socialist harmonious soci-
ety” (shehui zhuyi hexie shehui 社会主义 和谐社会)
that today casts a strange light, clearly more Marxist than
Confucian, on Chinese legal reform. 
For more than five years now, Chinese leaders have been
trying to deal with numerous social protest movements((3) by
constructing an overarching theoretical discourse which turns
law into one of the regime’s best allies. The first attempts to
reduce inequalities that had widened greatly in Chinese so-
ciety began in November 2002 when the need for social har-
mony figured in debates during the 16th Congress of the
Communist Party of China (CPC). In September 2004,
the Fourth Plenary Session of the Party’s 16th Central
Committee clarified the leadership’s goals. From then on,
Hu Jintao and other top Chinese leaders repeatedly referred
to the concept of “socialist harmonious society”, which ac-
quired a theoretical foundation in the landmark resolution of
the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee in
October 2006. Its resolution,((4) organised as a system of
core values,((5) specifies in familiar ideological terms, a set of
principles based on “Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong
Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the ‘Three Repre-
sents’.”((6) All this is directed towards the progressive realisa-
tion of a harmonious society, by 2020. Although the text of
the resolution is rather vague, it has an eye-catching group
of binary elements. These concepts, conceived as comple-
The norms of Chinese harmony
Disc ip l ina ry  ru l e s  a s  so c ia l  s tab i l i s e r
A  harmonious  so c i e ty  i s  one  in  wh i ch  the  ru l e  o f  l aw  i s  g i v en  g r ea t e r  s t r eng th  and  author i ty (1 )
LE ÏLA  CHOUKROUNE AND ANTOINE  GARAPON
1. Hexie shehui,  xuyao yi ge geng qiang da de, geng quan wei de fazhi. Taken from reso-
lution adopted at the 6th plenary session of the 16th Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China in October 2006.
2. The 1999 amendments had ratified this development by inscribing the concept of
“socialist rule of law” into the Chinese constitution. Article 5 says: “The People’s
Republic of China governs the country according to law and makes it a socialist coun-
try ruled by law. The state upholds the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal sys-
tem.” The text of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xianfa 中华人民共和国宪法), as amended in December 2004, is avail-
able on the following site: http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm
(Consulted 24 November 2007).
3. Figures for the annual number of incidents seem to be getting harder to find. A report of
the Congressional Research Service based on official Chinese sources spoke of a 50%
increase in “public order disturbances” between 2003 and 2005, with 87,000 incidents
for 2005 alone. See. http://www.cfr.org/publication/10748/crs_report.html (consulted
18 September 2007). 
See also, China Rights Forum, China’s social insecurity, No.1, 2005. 
These movements have obviously not stopped over the last two years, as the Chinese
press itself is reporting on them daily. A recent report in the International Herald Tribune
(8 July 2007) noted a Xinhua dispatch saying that local authorities who do poorly in
maintaining social order in rural areas could not qualify for promotion. See
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/07/08/asia/AS-GEN-China-Rural-Unrest.php (con-
sulted 18 September 2007).
4. Available in full in Mandarin on the Xinhua website: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/
2006-10/18/content_5218639.htm (consulted 25 September 2007).
5. See Xinhua http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/18/content_5219111.htm
(consulted 25 September 2007).
6. Included in the preamble of the Constitution through the 2004 amendments, the theory
of the ‘Three Represents’ (san ge daibiao) seeks to legitimize the move to integrate “the
most advanced productive forces” in running the country. Hence the opportunity for
entrepreneurs to become Party members.
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Whereas the concept of “ socialist rule of law” punctuated political discourse in the late 1990s, it is the idea of a “socialist
harmonious society” that today casts a strange light, clearly more Marxist than Confucian, on Chinese legal reform.
This theoretical framework turns law into a disciplinary principle dedicated to society’s moral construction. If law is
seen as an instrument for legitimizing power, it remains implicitly but primarily subordinate to the regime’s
durability. Although more and more ordinary citizens are seizing hold of normative tools being put at their disposal,
the party-state, fearful of being outflanked, is seeking to snuff out the democratic ferment contained in forces it has
itself unleashed.
The norms of Chinese harmony
mentary, however contain a number of contradictions which
become clearly apparent once the proposition is analysed in
its entirety. The socialist harmonious society is to be
founded on “democracy and the rule of law, equity and jus-
tice, honesty and comradeship, vitality, stability and order,
as well as harmony between Man and nature”. All these el-
ements are closely linked to the establishment of the social-
ist rule of law, an ideal which seems to run the whole edi-
fice. But it remains to be seen which will prevail — rule of
law over democracy, equity over justice or order over vitality.
A rudimentary explanation had actually been given by Hu
Jintao on 4 March 2006, when he drew up a list of “Eight
Honours, Eight Disgraces” marking a moral boundary be-
tween good and evil:((7)
— Love the country; do it no harm.
— Serve the people; do no disservice.
— Follow science; discard ignorance.
— Be diligent; not indolent.
— Be united, help each other; make no gains at 
others’ expense.
— Be honest and trustworthy; do not give up 
morals for profits.
— Be disciplined and law-abiding; not chaotic 
and lawless.
— Live plainly, struggle hard; do not wallow 
in luxuries and pleasures.
These rules of conduct for the development of a “socialist
morality” are not just a flight of fancy; but are meant to be
practiced. An example of this is Hu Jintao having ceremoni-
ously greeted 53 new “moral models”.((8)
The penultimate proposition above bears reflection: “Be dis-
ciplined and law-abiding; not chaotic and lawless.” This goes
to the heart of the theoretical framework which seeks to turn
law into a disciplinary principle bearing in mind the moral
construction of society. Law not only disciplines the conduct
of the physical individual; it captures the heart through a
willing commitment to higher moral imperatives.((9) This ob-
jective, to be considered in greater detail in the main body
of this discussion, was clearly illustrated in the opinions pub-
lished by the Supreme People’s Court on 15 January 2007.
The recommendations, aimed at clarifying the role of the ju-
diciary in building the socialist harmonious society,((10) were
followed in March 2007 by two statements by the Supreme
People’s Court stressing the “positive role” of mediation in
resolving conflicts. According to this set of directives, the
first “duty” of people’s courts is to resolve social conflicts
while maintaining stability, safeguarding economic develop-
ment and promoting social harmony in the pursuit of justice
and equity.((11) The idea of a “socialist rule of law” is a con-
stant point of reference as can be seen in this set of injunc-
tions: “A harmonious society is a society governed by law”
(hexie shehui jiu shi fazhi shehui 和谐
社会就是法治社会); “A harmonious society depends on
the rule of law” (hexie shehui yao kao fazhi
和谐社会，要靠法治); “A harmonious society needs a
stronger legal system that wields greater authority” (hexie
shehui xuyao yi ge gengqiang da de geng quanwei de fazhi
和谐社会，需要一个更强大的、更权威的法治). 
At the same time, Luo Gan’s statements have clearly set lim-
its on the judiciary’s ambition to act independently. In a
statement entitled “[T]he political responsibility of judicial
organs in constructing a harmonious society”, published in
the Party periodical, Seeking Truth, Luo Gan, a prominent
former member of the CPC Politburo Standing Committee,
who had been in charge of judicial matters, launched a vi-
cious attack on the regime’s enemies, who were accused of
using the courts to modernise China by westernising and di-
viding it.((12)
If law is viewed as an instrument for legitimising power, its
utilisation is implicitly dependent on a higher imperative,
the regime’s durability. Herein lies the paradox of Chinese
judicial and institutional reforms: while more and more or-
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7. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/18/content_5220576.htm (consulted 25
September 2007).
8. See  http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-09/19/content_6118495.htm (consult-
ed 25 September 2007).
9. The dialectic of the link between law and morality is now directly dealt with by mem-
bers of the National People’s Congress (NPC). See Fa Gongwei, “The law as lower limit
of morality and morality as higher standard of law.”http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/
common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=372398&pdmc=110118 (consulted 10 October
2007).
10. The complete text of the opinions is available in Mandarin on this website:
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=5886&keyword=harmonious
%20society (consulted 18 September 2007).
11. Specifically, these opinions stress the need to protect individual rights, especially those
of workers and peasants. A number of social conflicts such as those arising from cam-
paigns to restructure state enterprises are targeted. Direct reference is made to protect-
ing fundamental rights in the penal system. Courts must also pay special attention to
resolving environmental disputes and issues involving international and comparative
law, especially those pertaining to Taiwan, Hong Kong or Macao. Lastly, the court’s opin-
ions stress the fight against judicial corruption and the need for transparency of the jus-
tice system. These latter goals must be fully achieved by 2020, by which time the
Chinese judicial system, having become more transparent, will thereby be better able to
protect human rights. 
12. See http://www.qsjournal.com.cn/qs/20070201/GB/qs%5E448%5E0%5E1.htm (con-
sulted 30 September 2007). All this caused something of a stir and notably drew com-
ment in an article by Joseph Kahn in the New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/02/03/world/asia/03china.html?_r=1&n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%2 (con-
sulted 24 September 2007).
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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
dinary citizens are seizing the normative tools being put at
their disposal, the party-state, too concerned over the
prospect of being outflanked, is seeking to snuff out the dem-
ocratic ferment contained within its own creation. Avoid-
ance of conflict through the mediation of law understood as
moral discipline belongs to a pre-political vision of moder-
nity. The tensions and ambiguities of the law contribute as
much to the construction of socialist harmony as they do to
the liberation of an individual conscious of belonging to a
community, but also seeking to live a life of freedom.
We have chosen to consider the Chinese notion of socialist
harmony in the context of modernity by seeking to under-
stand the role played by this new legal ethic (I) which is
based on a system of justice in search of consistency (II) and
which seems to offer an illusory response to contemporary
questionings about the idea of justness (III).Harmonious soci ety :  a dif fe rent  ethics  of  law 
China has made undeniable strides over the last 30 years of
institutional and legislative reform. The constant flow of
norms is impressive, in terms of their vigour and the will be-
hind them. The legal revolutions of 1972-82, 1992-99 and
2001 have reshaped the normative landscape: adoption of a
Constitution detached from its revolutionary moorings, pro-
motion of “socialist market economy” and “socialist legal
system”, accession to the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) and a complete overhaul of “economic law” to
bring about greater uniformity and improved legislative trans-
parency. The constitutional amendments of 2004 carried
this modernising trend further by recognising the “inviolabil-
ity of private property” and stressing the state’s intention to
protect “human rights”. 
These changes in the theory and practice of Chinese
law have usually been understood in terms of globalised
economic relations, to which China has responded by
institutionalising and internationalising its legal system,
thereby contributing to the gradual emergence of a
legal consciousness and a new way of relating to
norms.((13)
And yet, a survey of the whole edifice to try and understand
its ultimate purpose would only leave one highly puzzled
over this reforming frenzy. What in fact is the goal of these
30 years of legalisation (fazhihua法制化)? The extension
of the idea of socialist harmonious society to the legal sphere
provides a partial answer, but it is probably not what one
hoped for.
A cho ice  o f  va lues:   harmonious  soci etybr ings  about  justi ce  and  equity
The socialist harmonious society subsumes a range of values
officially inspired by Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong
thought, Deng Xiaoping theory and the Three Represents.
An examination of official speeches and recent legislative
measures would, in fact, lead to summarily dismissing the
view that it has Confucian influence. Irrespective of whether
the party-state invokes them or not, Confucian values do not
seem to exert the influence often credited to them, even
though such values are increasingly discernible in Chinese
society at large. Without actually clarifying the ambiguities
of their current discourse, Chinese leaders avoid all direct
linkages to Confucian thought.((14) On the contrary, they try
desperately to find a common thread between their latest
policies and Marxist doctrine. Hence the many references to
the Manifesto of the Communist Party and the repeated
stress on the “core of socialist values”. These are systemati-
cally laid out, linked to “China’s past experiences,” and are
in fact summed up in Hu Jintao’s eight “Honours and Dis-
graces”.((15) In this search for socialist values with Chinese
characteristics, the “hero” figure is again sanctified through
the designation of “national moral models,”((16) the new Lei
Fengs of the modern era.((17)
From a legal point of view, it is interesting to note that “so-
cialist harmonious society” now covers all other goals and in
a sense, it includes justice and equity. If not exactly a return
to the past, this at least suggests a tendency towards circum-
spection on advances made in protecting and guaranteeing
rights. All this gives credence to the view that there are par-
allel developments of competing legal cultures.
Meanwhile, just the last ten or so years have witnessed an
emerging legal culture that is unquestionably new — from
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13. On this and for an integrated coverage of the main aspects of Chinese judicial reform,
see Stanley B. Lubman and Leïla Choukroune, ‘L’incomplète réforme par le droit’
[Incomplete reform through law], Esprit, February 2004. 
14. In this context we share the view of Alice Miller, who believes that the socialist harmo-
nious society is in the process of accommodating itself more readily to a return to the
neo-Soviet language dear to Hu Jintao than to a genuine re-reading of Confucian
thought. 
See Alice Miller, ‘Hu Jintao and the Sixth Plenum’, China Leadership Monitor, No. 20,
Winter 2007. http://www.hoover.org/publications/clm/issues/6301112.html (consulted
25 September 2007). 
15. See http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/4933374.html (consulted 25 September
2007). 
16. See http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/6266474.html (consulted 26
September 2007). 
17. On the resurgence of the hero in political discourse at the end of the 1990s, see the fas-
cinating article by Michel Bonnin,”When the Saints come Marching Back”, China
Perspectives, n° 5, May-June 1996, pp. 10-19. 
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The norms of Chinese harmony
young students’ enthusiasm for the legal profession, televi-
sion programmes denouncing corruption or injustices, the
flourishing “literature on the legal system” (fazhi wenxue
法制 文学), the rising number of lawsuits, to even the re-
lentless determination of workers or farmers to fight for their
rights. Though considered during the revolutionary period to
be harmful to the interests of the ruling class, law as a means
of resolving social issues seems to be enjoying new found re-
spect. The Sun Zhigang affair definitely heralded a trend to
make use of legal solutions.((18) But it also revealed the gov-
ernment’s endless capacity to exert control. The reference is
to the tragic death in custody of the young designer from
Hubei province, imprisoned because he had not been carry-
ing an identity card or temporary residence permit. Brought
to light by the Guangzhou press (notably Nanfang Dushi
Bao), the affair sparked widespread indignation and led fi-
nally to a revision of the 1982 administrative “ Measures for
the Custody and Repatriation of Vagrant Beggars in Cities”.
But it is sometimes forgotten that this incident also led to a
number of convictions and summary executions and a firm
gag on the media.
Resisting by resorting to law((19) clashes with the firm resolve
of a structure that is at once centralised and powerful, lo-
calised and anarchic. The real question raised by this rela-
tive alacrity for legal matters is the justiciability of rights the-
oretically guaranteed by a legal system that can at times be
as mired in technicalities as in democratic states. The inten-
tionality of this particular legal ethic hardly augurs improve-
ments even in the long run. 
What intentionality  for  lega l  re forms?
The syncretic nature of China’s legal system no longer
evokes surprise. Although drawn from foreign rules and
practices, China has Sinicized them the better to integrate
them.((20) In this case, it is as if this Sinicization undertaken
by a socialist harmonious society, which is reinventing China
itself under the Party’s watchful eye, was designed mainly to
stall for time. Reacting to criticisms from the “New Left”
and to popular unrest, the socialist harmonious society
adopts diversionary tactics, leading with seeming goodwill
into a nowhere,((21) which will be discussed later. 
This particularisation also allows a troublesome political uni-
versal to be kept at bay. China’s ambiguous attitude towards
international law is exemplified by its non-ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which,
if applied domestically, would result in far-reaching changes
to current criminal law standards and – in not the least of its
effects – render justiciable, both within China and exter-
nally, a number of fundamental rights.((22)
Seen in this light, “socialist harmonious society” appears, at
first glance, as a softer version of something common to all to-
talitarian systems: the idea of “One People”. This central
dogma can be formulated even more easily in its negative
form: a classless society, a whole without internal divisions.
Indeed, as Claude Lefort has shown, “the whole totalitarian
edifice rests on the fantasy of a society presumed to have
overcome internal divisions. Everything is given over to the
compulsion of producing unity, or rather the appearance of it.
This compulsion is the real categorical imperative of totalitar-
ian systems. (…) Now, totalitarian society has been, and con-
tinues to be, affected by democratic individualism. It is only
intelligible against a background of democratic modernity.”((23)
Here, the interest in the idea of socialist harmonious society
stems less from what it holds aloft than from what it hides,
namely who is responsible for defining this harmony? The
Chinese Communist Party of course, but invoking what legit-
imacy — its separation from Chinese society?
Making such a comparison with totalitarian society is as
tempting as it is misplaced. Today it is rather farfetched to
speak of totalitarian society in describing a country like
China where individual wealth is growing at a breakneck
pace and unabashedly. From this springs the conjuring di-
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18. See Keith J. Hand, “Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and
Evolving Forms of Citizen Action in the People’s Republic of China”, Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law, Vol. 45, n° 1, 2007.
19. On the idea of “rightful resistance” see Neil J. Diamant, Stanley B. Lubman, Kevin
O’Brien, Engaging the Law in China, State, Society and Possibilities for Justice, Stanford
University Press, 2005
20. On the hopes and limitations of the internationalisation of Chinese law arising from the
example of the WTO, see Leïla Choukroune, “The Accession of China to the WTO and
Legal reform: is China heading towards a rule of law through internationalisation with-
out democracy?”, in Mireille Delmas-Marty and Pierre-Etienne Will (eds), La Chine et la
démocratie, [China and Democracy] Fayard, 2007, pp. 617-661.
21. This is a reference to Thomas More’s Utopia as a means of political and spiritual strug-
gle. 
22. See Leïla Choukroune, “Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, Columbia
Journal of Asian Law, Vol.19, n°1, Spring-Fall 2005. By virtue of article 2 paragraph 3 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
“(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are vio-
lated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been com-
mitted by persons acting in an official capacity; 
“(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto deter-
mined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the
possibilities of judicial remedy;
“(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when grant-
ed.” See www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/ccpr.pdf (consulted November 24)
23. Cf. Hugues Poltier, Claude Lefort. La découverte de la politique [Claude Lefort. The
Discovery of Politics], Michalon, 1997, pp. 91-92.
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mension of socialist harmonious society. It is becoming ur-
gent to exorcise the direction towards which all the “infra-
structural reforms” are leading, as might have been said ear-
lier in language which would not be out of place with the
Party today. It is well known how important private property
has been, for a certain John Locke notably, in developing
the idea of human rights. The new Chinese ideal does not
shy away from playing with fire, by itself using the vocabu-
lary of rights but giving it a different meaning.
Law in China today has become more than a mere alibi: it
is the expression of the gap between a conflict-free society,
the ideal dreamt up by the Party, and the individualism the
people eagerly seek. Law is not a mere totalitarian instru-
ment, but serves as the arena for playing out this tension,
this contradiction between, on the one hand, the aspiration
for individualism, whose promotion is the necessary means
of boosting the regime’s respectability in the eyes of
“civilised” nations, and on the other, concerns about social
cohesion under the party’s guidance. However imperfect it
may be, the legal system is increasingly allowing the expres-
sion of this tension, if only because economic globalisation
no longer affords any choice in the matter. 
All this obviously renders inadequate the use of the qualifi-
cation totalitarian, because it would be an insult to the mem-
ory of millions of Chinese victims in the last century. This is
why we have preferred to use the idea of disciplinary law or
disciplinary rules, better attuned to current realities. As
such, disciplinary law contrasts with liberal or individualist
law. From this perspective, what is essential is to ensure the
cohesion of an institution, a group of people, and not really
to guarantee individual rights. Disciplinary law is not overtly
opposed to them, but all these issues, such as individual
rights, are treated as secondary. What counts is ensuring the
smooth working of society as a whole and the regime’s sur-
vival. 
How do the differences between disciplinary law and lib-
eral law appear in concrete terms? It is through government
functions going unopposed, primarily. Disciplinary law is a
legal system in the leader’s hands; a leader who must appear
to lead, if possible, a leader who can certainly not do all he
wants to do, but whose power is not open to question. We
labelled the contrasting model liberal or individualist be-
cause its cardinal value lies in the importance accorded to
the individual. This brings us to the second criterion: disci-
plinary norms only make sense in closed communities, such
as those of a professional, family, sporting, or religious na-
ture, wherein relationships are necessarily asymmetrical and
whose raison d’etre lies outside the reach of law. They are
predicated on an unquestioned purpose, which motivates
their very existence. This is so because such groups are al-
ways in fact sub-groups. At stake is only a part of something
larger: neither school nor business engages a person’s life in
its entirety but only in part. This compartmentalization does
not apply to the respect of fundamental rights – to life, lib-
erty, or property.
The confusion perpetrated by the expression “harmonious
society” arises from a collusion against the very nature of dis-
ciplinary law and its application no longer to a sub-commu-
nity such as business or school, but to the entire political
community; no more to a limited activity but to politics itself;
not just to some subsidiary matters, but to the very heart of
political coexistence.
These initial observations, as we shall see presently, can
yield an infinite number of illustrations in recent events in
Chinese law and its application. It is worth recalling again
that Law supports and legitimises a political edifice and
brooks no opposition. Thus does “harmonious society” re-
alise justice and equity.Justi ce  in  search of  “regular ity” 
One might hold, as John Rawls does, that “regular and im-
partial” and in this sense, fair application of rules, constitutes
“justice as regularity”.((24) Such a form of legality is essential
for establishing a rule of law. This is the major problem con-
fronting China today. On the one hand, law-making and its
application remain strongly tied to ideological constraints,
and on the other, the role of the judge, although subject to
an increasingly professionalised system, is still heavily de-
pendent on political factors.
Production and appl ication o f  laws:  questfo r harmony al lows  r ecourse  to  viol ence
The National People’s Congress and the State Council are
the two main organs that promulgate laws in China. While
the NPC and its Standing Committee are invested by the
1982 Constitution and the 2000 Legislation Law (lifa fa
立法法) with law-making power on a national scale (pro-
mulgation of “laws”, or falü 法律), the State Council has
the power to adopt administrative measures (rules or guiding
规定, regulations or tiaoli条例, circulars or tongzhi通知,
40 N o  2 0 0 7 / 3
24. Cf. John Rawls, Justice et démocratie [Justice and democracy], Editions du Seuil, Coll.
Points, 1993. 
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The norms of Chinese harmony
etc.) The role of these two organs, however, faces broad
competition from the legislative functions bestowed on other
state institutions. The Chinese system operates through at
least three different levels: national laws (falü 法律), na-
tional administrative regulations (xingzheng fagui
行政法规), and local administrative regulations (difang-
xing fagui 地方性法规). Moreover, ministries and com-
missions under the State Council can, for example, produce
orders, directives and regulations in their sphere of compe-
tence and in accordance with the texts promulgated by the
State Council. Local People’s Congresses and their Stand-
ing Committees can also make laws, of course, as long as
they do not clash with texts drawn up at the national level,
all of which complicates the whole exercise. Finally, the
People’s Congresses in the Autonomous Regions have the
power to adopt their own texts. 
Until China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), the government did not allow external participa-
tion in the legislative process. After that, the situation has
evolved and there is greater interaction with society, as
shown in recent debates on the adoption of the property law.
China’s accession to the WTO has also encouraged the
regime to publish a large number of legal texts and some
court decisions; however, access to these documents requires
real knowledge of the system and the language as there is no
truly systematic compendium.
At any step of the legislative pyramid, the Party may choose
to interfere. The legislature – not exactly elected democrati-
cally, and not free from surveillance – is furthermore granted
broad powers in terms of interpretation and control of the
application of laws and court decisions. Despite recent at-
tempts at constitutionalisation of rights, the absence of a hi-
erarchy of norms poses the problem of the effectiveness of
Chinese law. Confusing and contradictory laws and their
poor applicability in a uniform way quickly exposes them to
a process of abrogation through disuse, which incidentally,
serves by default to moderate legislative excess.
Difficulties in applying laws, a situation that has been con-
sistently denounced by Chinese and foreign experts for at
least 20 years, clearly represents the greatest impediment to
any genuine desire for reform. The lack of uniform and just
application of the law has a direct bearing on the establish-
ment of a rule of law. This complex question has many
facets, notably in relation to the enforcement of court deci-
sions. 
It is particularly interesting today to note that Chinese au-
thorities have undertaken several extensive campaigns to im-
plement laws. These campaigns are based on repression and
have had widely diverse objectives ranging from ensuring re-
spect for intellectual property, condemning actions resulting
in pollution, banning some religious practices and illegal land
requisitions, to closing undesirable internet cafes.((25) While
these actions do not mobilise the population in the same
way, they share some of their most salient characteristics
with anti-corruption campaigns (strike hard or yanda严打)
or earlier revolutionary campaigns to mobilise the masses
(yundong运动). This resemblance derives from the gener-
alised use of a form of violence conceived as a legitimate ca-
pacity for restraint by the state, but against which ultimately
there is no recourse. The topic is worthy of discussion in its
own right, but for now this use of violence by the state can
no doubt be linked to the deficiencies of a criminal law sys-
tem that remains highly repressive, and to the equally con-
troversial maintenance of the systems of Laojiao (laodong
jiaoyang 劳动教养) or “re-education through labour”,((26)
and Laogai (laodong gaizao 劳动改造) or “reform
through labour”.((27) This view of the application of the law
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25. This topic is currently being studied by Benjamin van Rooij and was already introduced
in “China’s War on Graft: Politico-Legal Campaigns against Corruption in China and Their
Similarities to the Legal Reactions to Crisis in the U.S.” Pacific Rim Law and Policy
Journal, 2005, pp. 289-336 
26. Laojiao (laodong jiaoyang), or “re-education through labour”, is an administrative meas-
ure taken by the Police and applicable to people over 16 years old who have committed
minor crimes that do not require criminal proceedings and for a period not exceeding
four years. 
27. Laogai (laodong gaizao), or “reform through labour”, is a criminal penalty determined by
a court after a conviction, according to provisions of Chinese law. The penalty incurred
can officially range from six months to 20 years in prison.
Sun Fengxiang, Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference Member, manager of Fengxiang Group, in
the court in Shenyang to stand trial. Sun was accused
of taking bribes, corruption and defalcation, with 25
million RMB yuan involved in the case
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fails to promote acceptability of the legal system and its pre-
dictability; furthermore, it tends to delegitimise the norms
and the role of a justice system, which aspires to profession-
alism and independence. 
Institutionalisation and prof ess ional isa-t ion:  The  judge  a t  the heart  of  re forms
During the years of reform, the courts were reorganised ac-
cording to a four-tier hierarchy, with the Supreme People’s
Court (Zuigao renmin fayuan 最高人民法院) at the
top.((28) There are 3,000 Basic People’s Courts with approx-
imately 200,000 judges. Their level of professionalism was
enhanced considerably in 2002 with the establishment of
the standard national exam, which has a success rate of
around 10%. The vast majority of practising judges has nev-
ertheless had no real legal training. There is obviously a
huge difference between a judge in the Supreme Court
trained in legal issues in China and overseas, aware of inter-
national realities and of belonging to a community of jurists
who are able to exercise true power to interpret the law and
a judge drawn from the ranks of the army or the police, ap-
pointed by a local people’s congress, and continually con-
fronting problems of legitimacy vis-a-vis Party officials, as
well as lacking resources and tempted by corruption.((29)
In 1999, the Supreme People’s Court adopted a first five-
year reform plan aimed at enhancing the professionalism
and independence of judges.((30) On 18 October 2001, the
Court published a code of ethics, targeting in particular ju-
dicial corruption.((31) Finally, in October 2005, the Court un-
veiled its second five-year plan (2006-2010), one of whose
highlights was to implement a process of centralised national
review of capital punishment sentences.((32) While it is a
clever means of depoliticising the law by strengthening the
powers of high-ranking judges, this reform runs the great risk
of being very difficult to implement. Despite the commend-
able efforts of a Supreme Court made more dynamic
through the profile of Xiao Yang as its president, the Party’s
interference remains too strong for the acclaimed modernisa-
tion to have real effect.((33)
Clearly this is a question of judicial independence. There is
no institution equivalent to a kind of high council for the ju-
diciary, for example, and there is absolutely no guarantee ei-
ther of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary
under any statute. More specifically, the Standing Commit-
tee of the CPC Political Bureau seems to be the body really
in charge of justice, through the establishment of a coordi-
nating group on judicial reform (sifa tizhi jizhi gaige
司法体制机制改革) chaired by Luo Gan. Through this
group and the Party’s discipline inspection commissions, the
entire judiciary apparatus (prosecution, judges, ministry and
even the police) is subject to the Party. Xiao Yang, the
Supreme Court president, himself elected — and liable to be
dismissed — by the NPC, has been clearly ill at ease over
constant political interference.((34) Frequent interventions by
Luo Gan, who has been very active in judicial discourse in
2007, highlight more than anything else this constant inter-
ference in the sphere of justice.((35) The White Paper on
Democracy, published in October 2005, exposed the
regime’s intentions by stating that the maintenance of the
“the unity of the leadership of the CPC, the people being
the masters of the country and ruling the country by law”
represented the most important principle for “building a so-
cialist political democracy” in China.((36)Fiction of  harmony or  i l lus ionof  justi ce
The illusion of justice conjured up by the peremptory affir-
mation of a desire for modernisation, not backed by real
means of realising the ambition, is becoming apparent in re-
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28. There are three other levels: 30 High People’s Courts (Gaoji renmin fayuan
高级人民法院), which have authority in provinces, autonomous regions and munici-
palities directly under the central government; 389 Intermediate People’s Courts
(Zhongji renmin fayuan 中级人民法院), which function at the prefecture level, with the
municipalities catered for by courts at the level of provinces and autonomous regions;
and, finally, more than 3,000 Basic People’s Courts (Jiceng renmin fayuan
基层人民法院), which have authority at the district and county level, and that are
sometimes complemented by other People’s Tribunals (Renmin fating 人民法庭) in the
instance of those counties that are geographically dispersed. Furthermore, there are
more than a hundred specialist tribunals with authority in matters of fishing, maritime
affairs, forestry, railways, etc.
29. For a precise and rigorous history of the last 30 years of judicial reform, see Stanley
Lubman, Bird in a Cage. Legal Reform in China after Mao, Stanford University Press,
1999. 
30. Cf.    Renmin Fayuan Wunian gaige Gangyao (Five-Year Program of Reform),
http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/xf/200511/20051128111114.htm (consulted 30
September 2007). 
31. See Li Yuwen, “Professional Ethics of Chinese Judges, A Rising Issue in the Landscape
of Judicial Practice”, China Perspectives, May-June 2003, http://chinaperspectives.
revues.org/document274.html. 
32. See Renmin Fayuan Dierge Wunian Gaige Gangyao (Second Five-Year Program of
Reform), http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/xf/200512/20051214221735.htm (consulted
30 September 2007). 
33. See Benjamin L. Liebman, “China’s Courts: Restricted Reform”, Columbia Journal of
Asian Law, in press, Winter 2007. 
34. There is intense speculation currently as to who would succeed Xiao Yang.
35. See his much discussed indictment of the Westernisation of the courts, http://www.
qsjournal.com.cn/qs/20070201/GB/qs%5E448%5E0%5E1.htm (consulted 30
September 2007). 
36. See http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-10/19/content_486206.htm
(consulted 30 September 2007).
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The norms of Chinese harmony
cent debates. We have chosen to devote special attention to
four major themes (property rights, labour rights, a return to
mediation and right of defence), which in their own ways
showcase a deep aspiration for a more just environment. 
An incomplete  protect ion  of  p roper ty r ights
Of all areas of Chinese law, it is the process of rewriting civil
law that most clearly highlights the contradictory forces at
work in judicial reforms that are torn between liberal lean-
ings and the need to preserve an authoritarian socialist
regime. How can one reconcile the liberal-inspired drafting
of a civil code, enshrining individual freedom and will, with
respect for a “socialist market economy” that seeks to justify
the arbitrary intervention of the state?((37) This fundamental
question has quite naturally peppered debate on a Chinese
doctrine deeply divided between two schools of thought: one
favoring legal transplants as a form of beneficial internation-
alisation, the other opposed to an acculturation that is un-
able to meet China’s needs.((38) It is by paying special atten-
tion to the debates within a community of increasingly bet-
ter trained jurists who are often well informed on the reality
abroad, that one understands how the birth of a civil society
has bolstered the work of these Chinese jurists seeking the
emergence of a legal system distinct from the state. The
technicalities of law seek in reality to encourage emancipa-
tion from the political power. 
Such contradictions, which were already at work during the
adoption of the 1999 Contracts Law, re-emerged with un-
precedented strength during the preliminary debate on the
much vaunted Property Law that took effect on 1 October
2007. It was clear since the end of the 1990s that the Chi-
nese “New Left”, which actually groups several movements,
had been wielding real influence over political debate.((39)
However, it was the interventions in August 2005 by Gong
Xiantian, a law professor at Beijing University, that sparked
lively comments from among jurists. Professor Gong – in
fact, an isolated figure – is a firm Marxist whose main argu-
ment was that protection of property rights was unconstitu-
tional. This would have remained anecdotal if Chinese au-
thorities had not taken up the matter. Wu Bangguo, Chair-
man of the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress, was reported to have directly contacted Professor
Gong, who then met Hu Kangsheng and Wang Shengming,
Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Legisla-
tive Affairs Commission of the NPC Standing Committee.
All this led to yet another postponement of the bill and,
most crucially, to its recasting in a mould more respectful of
socialist constitutional imperatives. It should be noted that
the passage of this law was achieved only at the end of a
legislative saga that began in the early 1990s. A first draft
had been presented in 2002 and was improved after a fash-
ion by the 2004 constitutional amendments that guaranteed
private property. Complications began in July 2005 when a
new draft was published with a view to gathering external
comments. Almost 12,000 reactions similar to that of Pro-
fessor Gong reached the Congress. Finally passed on 16
March 2007, and implemented on 1 October, the Property
law, largely based on the German civil code, (Bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch or BGB), will soon be complemented by a set
of interpretative opinions to be issued by the Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court.((40) The complex structure of this law demands
detailed study, provision by provision. Some provisions clar-
ify and obviously consolidate private property, but within
the framework of a “socialist market economy” that gives
precedence to state and collective property. The thorny
questions of land ownership and eviction are only partially
covered. The application of this law will undoubtedly be dif-
ficult because of its inherent contradictions.((41) In this sense,
it would seem that private property protection remains insuf-
ficient and that the number of disputes will continue to
grow. 
Human r ights  and businesses:  the  contrasting e ffects of  Chinese  globalisation
Internationalisation of Chinese law has special effect on the
world of business and more specifically Chinese labour law.
However, acceptance of international standards and prac-
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37. See the remarkable Ph.D. Dissertation of Shi Jiayou, La Codification du droit civil chi-
nois au regard de l’expérience français,[Codification of Chinese civil law in the light of
the French experience] L.G.D.J., 2006.  
38. See Hélène Piquet, La Chine au carrefour des traditions juridiques [China at the cross-
roads of legal tradition], Brussels, Bruylant, 2005. 
39. For an outline of the debate driving these currents see Leslie Hook, “The Rise of China’s
New Left”, Far Eastern Economic Review, April 2007. For a portrait of Wang Hui, the fig-
urehead of the “New Left”, see for example Pankaj Mishra, “China’s New Leftist”, New
York Times, 15 October 2006. 
40. Text available in Mandarin on the Lawinfo China website: http://www.lawinfochina.com/
law/display.asp?db=1&id=5920&keyword (consulted 3 December 2007)
41. For a remarkable case study on eviction and land rights see Eva Pils, “Land Disputes,
Rights Assertion and Social Unrest in China: A Case from Sichuan”, Columbia Journal of
Asian Law, Vol. 19, n°1, Spring-Fall 2005. “Incoherent or unclear legal rules that were
also ignored in practice have made it hard to expect any justice from the legal system
as it is, (…) and even if the rule most favourable to the peasants interest were enforced,
there would still be some doubt about the fairness of a legal system establishing clas-
sifications of land and residential status that led to such great gains and losses on dif-
ferent sides of the divide in the context of urbanization.” (pp. 284-285). 
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tices remains selective,((42) and the modernisation of Chinese
corporate standards also face resistance from multinational
firms, as the recent debate on the passing of the new Labour
Contract Law showed. 
Since the laws on labour and trade unions came into force
in 1995 and 2002, Chinese workers have received theoreti-
cal protection, but although this may not yet fully comply
with international standards – China has only ratified four of
the eight Fundamental Conventions of the International
Labour Organisation (ILO)((43) – it is not negligible. How-
ever proclaiming rights does not necessarily guarantee their
application. These rights lack guarantees since many extra-
judicial factors prevent their application. The granting of
labour rights too remains highly selective. Almost two-thirds
of the population has yet to receive protection from labour
rights set out in the 1994 Law. It should also be noted that
some categories of workers are inadequately protected and
are indeed victims of abject discrimination, such as through
the residence permit system (hukou户口) and job discrim-
ination on the basis of sex or disability, among others. While
the Law on Labour Security of 29 June 2002 and the Law
on the Prevention and Treatment of Occupational Illnesses
of 27 October 2001 may represent real normative advances,
the question of their application remains. 
Forced labour is obviously the darkest area in this general
picture. Obligatory or forced labour is banned almost univer-
sally. ILO Conventions 29 (1930) and 105 (1957) are the
ones most countries adhere to.((44) China has not ratified ei-
ther convention and is in a highly ambiguous position: the
state continues to use forced labour on a large scale and
does so totally illegally, while condemning the crime of
forced labour in private enterprises. There is no clear indi-
cation today of a legislative reappraisal of the policies of “re-
form through labour” (Laogai or laodong gaizao) or “re-ed-
ucation through labour” (Laojiao or laodong jiaoyang).
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42. The selective nature of this internationalisation was pointed out several years ago by
Pitman Potter. For a recent analysis of these trends and China’s emergence on the inter-
national scene, see Pitman Potter, “China and the International Legal System: Challenges
of Participation”, The China Quarterly, Vol. 191, September 2007, pp. 699-715. 
43. See http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/docs/declworld.htm (consulted 10 October 2007). 
44. See http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm (consulted 10 October 2007). 
A worker at the production line in a textile factory in Zibo, Shandong
province. Will the textile workers benefit from the new labour contract law?
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These relatively profitable activities keep a virtual under-
ground economy going, aided and supervised by the state.
Finally, the lack of independent union representation se-
verely curbs Chinese workers’ collective exercise of their fun-
damental rights and freedoms.
As industrial disputes have proliferated, directly linked to deep
changes in China’s economy, novel methods of settling disputes
have arisen. A progressive shift has occurred from mediation to
court actions, but there is little cause for drawing any encour-
aging conclusions as it is hardly a general trend: only a limited
number of disputes may be subject to the courts, and the gov-
ernment is now encouraging a return to mediation.
This relative legal rationality does not allow for integrating
the main international standards China has signed – starting
with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights – and gives rise to much doubt over the ben-
efits of voluntarism promoted in the many codes of conduct
adopted by foreign companies based in China. The recent
debate on the adoption of a new labour contracts law is ev-
idence of this. In March 2006, the NPC Standing Commit-
tee approved a first draft law on labour contracts and sought
public comment. By April, the Congress had received
191,849 comments, mostly from workers, according to offi-
cial sources. The responses from foreign firms, especially
their representative bodies (such as the American Chamber
of Commerce in Shanghai and the European Chamber of
Commerce), were the most surprising. After years of criti-
cism of the loopholes in China’s legal system, the multina-
tionals were rejecting a document that would give greater
protection to labour rights because this would delay eco-
nomic reforms and thus have a negative effect on invest-
ment.((45) Progress in Chinese law was in this instance being
compromised by the economic ambitions of multinationals
seeking to maintain a legal muddle that was advantageous to
them in terms of labour cost.((46)
Despite outside pressure, the new labour contract law will
take effect in early 2008. It contains some advances and
clarifies many legal concepts including the collective labour
contract. Its application may however be limited because
there are no independent unions and dispute settlement re-
mains highly unpredictable as it is still largely under state
control.
Return of  med iation in  response  to di si l lu-s ionment with the  jud iciary
Escalating disputes and the relative inability of the justice
system to resolve them have aroused disillusionment, in re-
sponse to which Chinese authorities are again promoting
their classic tool, mediation, but now vested with the virtu-
ous halo of socialist harmony. Mediation is being promoted
as the best alternative to court action, especially administra-
tive litigation.
Introduced into the legal studies courses in 1981 and into
the compulsory curriculum only in 1986, Chinese adminis-
trative law is recent and still evolving. The much anticipated
Administrative Procedure Law of 1989 marked a decisive
turning point by allowing the public to take on the adminis-
tration for any illegal acts.((47) The 1994 Law on State Com-
pensation, as well as the 1996 Law on Administrative
Penalty, are part of this evolving framework. The public has
not quite taken to this form of justice in droves, as only about
2% of cases pitted a citizen against an administration.((48)
Court access for those affected by an administrative decision
seems to contradict the traditional and apparently unchang-
ing socialist credo of “government of the people by the ad-
ministration” (guan guan min 官管民). Authorities will
have to take account progressively of modest efforts to make
the administration accountable to the people (min gao guan
民告官).((49) All these changes, deemed positive by some
analysts, stem from an abiding desire to maintain and
strengthen social stability.((50) The 1989 Administrative Pro-
cedure Law grants limited control of administrative actions.
The courts can only control the legality of the norms, not
their validity or reasonableness. Further, when an adminis-
trative tribunal finds that a legal rule conflicts with one of a
higher organ, it has no power to invalidate the first rule, and
at best can refuse to apply it, which happens but rarely. Only
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45. See the reports of the American Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai and the European
Chamber of Commerce. http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/
785039 (consulted 10 October 2007).
46. This much publicised debate obliged some companies to answer for their attitude and
to reveal their Chinese labour policy. See the Business and Human Rights site that pro-
vided a summary of the main arguments and documents. 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/Chinalabourlawreform (consulted 10
October 2007). 
47. Cf. Pitman B. Potter, “The administrative litigation law of the PRC: judicial review and
bureaucratic reform”, in Pitman B. Potter (ed.), Domestic Law Reforms in Post-Mao
China, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 270-304; Minxin Pei, “Citizens v. Mandarins:
administrative litigation in China”, The China Quarterly, n° 152 (1997), pp. 832-862.
48. See for example Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, “Suing the Local State: Administrative
Litigation in Rural China”, The China Journal, n° 51 (2004), pp. 75-96. 
49. Robert Heuser, “Le rôle des tribunaux administratifs dans la résolution des litiges entre
la société et le gouvernement chinois” [“The role of administrative courts in resolving
disputes between society and the Chinese government”], Perspectives chinoises, 2003. 
50. Robert Heuser, Ibid. Most analysts do not share these conclusions, however, and remain
cautious over the effectiveness of citizen protection in this much anticipated, yet disap-
pointing bill. P. Potter for example speaks of an “elusive objective”, linked to the bill’s
self-limiting character.
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those in charge of producing laws may invalidate the word-
ing of a law or administrative ruling.
Recent statements by Xiao Yang((51) favouring administrative
mediation (hejie 和解) hardly foreshadow a real improve-
ment to the system. Local courts have responded to the call
by the Supreme People’s Court president by backing the
proposal for letting cases be withdrawn in favour of non-ju-
dicial settlement. The cases in question seem to concern set-
tlement of matters relating to “mass movements” (expropria-
tion, restructuring of state enterprises, pollution, etc). In
such instances, the dispute is headed off to preserve the fic-
tion of harmonious cohesion of a people bound by the com-
mon ideal of stability. The objective is clear but, meanwhile,
a desperate struggle is under way to realise a right of de-
fence.
Controll ing human r ights  def enders :  acyni ca l  approach to justice
In August 2006, the People’s Court in Yinan county, Shan-
dong province, sentenced the human rights defender Chen
Guangcheng to four years and three months in prison for “de-
liberate destruction of property” and “organisation of demon-
strations aimed at disrupting the traffic”. A farcical appeal
judgement, made in November 2006, again showed disdain
for the most elementary rights of defence. A peasant who has
been blind since his infancy, Chen Guangcheng, aged 36, is
one of those “barefoot lawyers” who no longer hesitate to use
a legal system that is tending to offer a modicum of protec-
tion, in defending fellow citizens against the state’s arbitrari-
ness. Outraged at the massive campaigns of sterilisation and
enforced abortion in his region, Chen earned renown
through his fervent support for peasants who suffered the ex-
cesses of the One Child policy. Using the American “class
action” model, he mobilised the local population in order to
get the judge to condemn illegal acts committed by the au-
thorities. All this could be analysed as a major test of the
“rule by law” principle that Beijing touts as guarantee that it
would implement a “socialist rule of law” respecting individ-
ual freedoms now enshrined in the constitution.
Chen represents an unprecedented movement, of “barefoot
lawyers”, the new human rights defenders (weiquan renshi
维权人士) and self-taught jurists imbued with a passion
for justice and sharing a fierce desire to challenge authorities
on the strength of legal arguments, but also because they
have nothing more to lose.
Unfortunately, Chen Guangcheng’s case is not an isolated
one. In 2003, Zheng Enchong was sentenced to three years
in prison for having defended Shanghai residents who were
victims of expropriation. He was released in June 2006 and
still faces police surveillance. His professional licence has
been withdrawn and all communication with the outside
world seems to be banned. In July 2007, while on his way
to the trial of real estate tycoon Zhou Zhengyi, accompa-
nied by his wife and other victims of expropriation, Zheng
Enchong was badly beaten by police who barred his court
entry.
Yang Maodong (or Guo Feixiong), a Beijing lawyer in the
former Shengzhi law firm, was arrested many times and
beaten for having defended residents of Taishi village in
Guangdong province, who were trying to bring down a cor-
rupt local official. Imprisoned in Guangzhou and Shenyang,
Yang Maodong suffered torture and other inhuman and de-
grading treatment. His defence made sure the matter was
brought to the attention of Manfred Nowak, the United Na-
tions Special Rapporteur on Torture, China being a party to
the Convention against Torture. His trial was deferred.
Gao Zhisheng, a famous lawyer known for supporting
Christians, Falungong members and his own colleagues, un-
dertook to defend Yang Maodong by organising a hunger
strike. His licence to work was revoked in 2005. Detained
by police since August 2006, he has been officially accused
of “inciting subversion”, an extremely grave charge. His
lawyer Mo Shaoping was denied contact with him on the
pretext that state secrets were at stake.((52)
On 29 September 2007, Li Heping, a young Beijing lawyer,
was kidnapped in broad daylight, held, interrogated and tor-
tured with electric current by a group of about ten people,
then released in the dead of night in the countryside. On re-
turning home, he found his that computer had been refor-
matted and his professional identity card and personal de-
tails confiscated. Li faces constant harassment and is
watched by the Beijing Public Security Bureau.((53)
What type of regime could be committing such gross viola-
tions of human rights and dignity so widely and with total
impunity?
The professional work of lawyers receives insufficient protec-
tion. Banned between 1957 and 1977, lawyers were gradu-
ally rehabilitated after the 1978 constitution, and the new
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51. See http://www.court.gov.cn/news/bulletin/activity/200703300020.htm for a version in
Mandarin (consulted 30 September 2007).
52. See Eva Pils, “Asking the Tiger for his Skin: Rights Activism in China”, Fordham
International Law Journal, April, 2007, Vol.30 pp. 1209-1287 and Fu Hualing, “When
Lawyers are prosecuted” 2007, Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 2, n° 2, pp 1-38.
53. See for example http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/press?revision%5fid
=45124&item%5fid=45122 (consulted 10 October 2007).
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criminal rules that in 1979 restored the right of defence.
Lawyers nevertheless remained “legal agents of the state”, a
type of official with special status, whose activities were fully
overseen by public bodies. The “All China Lawyers Associ-
ation” (ACLA) and its local branches have increasingly
taken charge of managing these professionals. That hardly
makes for their independence as they report to the justice
ministry. The 1996, “Law on Lawyers and Legal Represen-
tation” was envisaged as a professional charter for a bur-
geoning profession.((54) Lawyers finally had a right to work
outside the state system and private firms mushroomed.
However, a number of provisions tend to restrict freedom of
action by Chinese human rights defenders. Article 96 of the
Criminal Procedure Law stipulates that lawyers accused of
divulging state secrets who wish to seek outside help should
first obtain permission from public security authorities. Even
the concept of state secrets is defined so vaguely as to ren-
der rights defenders vulnerable to such accusations.
Article 306 of the Criminal Procedure Law, widely used to
silence lawyers, deems some actions criminal by equating
them with fabrication of evidence or perjury. The text of the
Law on Lawyers has undergone recent changes, but its di-
rection and intention are unclear.
These developments go against commendable efforts to
modernise and promote a Chinese legal system that is open-
ing up increasingly to external influences. The restoration of
norms, which is occurring through legislative and procedural
make-believe, hides an ambiguous attitude towards law. This
illusion of justice is based on the fiction of harmony. Conclus ion
Harmonious soc iety between ideology and utopia
The purpose of the last 30 years’ legal construction is difficult
to grasp. The tension in China’s legal system between liberal
temptation and preservation of socialist dogma limits the scope
of reforms. Despite indisputable achievements in terms of law-
making and institution-building, the lack of hierarchy of norms,
of separation of powers and crucially of judicial independence,
the unclear status of rights defenders, the serious shortcomings
in protecting individual rights, and the ever present political
considerations impede all progress towards a true rule of law.
More worryingly, the propagation of the socialist harmo-
nious society concept not only seeks to respond to a legiti-
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54. The lawyer law has just been amended. See http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/
common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=373837&pdmc=110106 (consulted  November 24,
2007) 
The China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group holding a protest at the
China Liaison Office in Hong Kong (22 June 2007) to express concern over
recent incidents of mainland lawyers and activists being beaten up and
detained by public security officers. 
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mate quest for moral values able to fill a void created by the
market. It symbolises a strong desire to set right a capitalist
and individualist society born of reforms. In this reactionary
phase, the emancipated individual is again brought into line
by laws that he, on the contrary, would like to use to ensure
his true liberation.
Liberal law and disciplinary law are undoubtedly two ideal
types of law, for the distinction between them is not so clear
in practice. No one can claim to be totally democratic because
of the pervasive vestiges of disciplinary law, confined to some
professional communities or families. The term disciplinary
law thus explains away the imperfections of Chinese law. But
we would be overlooking the fact that to be called law many
requirements must be met. When does law begin to fulfil its
own pre-eminent function that sets it apart from other “norma-
tive orders”((55) such as religion, morality or politics? The an-
swer is made less easy by the fact that the forms law can take
can serve all those masters: one finds a religious law (Koranic
law), customary law and administrative law. What constitutes
it as law in all these cases is firstly a formal criterion: law must
appear as an external reference, a third force not accessible in-
discriminately and which cannot be modified arbitrarily in re-
sponse to a situation. Two simple tests help one know what
type of regime one confronts. The first is that of the independ-
ence of judges: are they formally independent vis-a-vis politi-
cal authorities? Do they do what is in their power to ensure
rights are respected, including against the state? The second
test applies to the citizens: to what extent are they able to
claim their rights against the government? To what extent
does law protect the mighty? In reality these two tests are but
one: has the society reached a level of individuation sufficient
to allow for both the application of law itself and citizens’ lives
to be regulated by law? However, what the “harmonious so-
ciety” idea implies is nothing more than an immense internal
set of rules — carefully tended by the country’s leaders — to
which Chinese citizens must submit without really being able
to challenge them. This set of rules may bear the name of law,
and closely resemble it, but does not deserve to be charac-
terised as rule of law or to be associated with the vocabulary
of human rights. 
Indeed, instituting a socialist harmonious society involves
revisiting China’s common past in order to reinvent it and
insert the individual into a “pseudo-holism”((56) that has to-
talitarian impulsions. This vaunted harmony of the social
order leads to silencing discord. A pluralistic debate of
ideas cannot exist. John Rawls has shown that the ex-
change of points of view constituting the “fact of pluralism”
— whether or not in conflict — forms part of the ferment of
modern democracy.((57) But the successive waves of media
clampdowns, along with the changing status of human
rights defenders, testify to a desire to stifle dissent.
A real harmonious society would undoubtedly require a state
in which the rule of law prevails, but a rule of law founded
on and protected by democratic values. Jürgen Habermas
has clearly demonstrated the complementary character of
democracy and rule of law.((58) An ontological link exists be-
tween these two paradigms. The role of law is essential, but
a law that is “legitimate is only compatible with a mode of
legal constraint that does not destroy the rational grounds
that exist to obey the law”. Citizens must be able to exercise
their “communicational liberty” and to “obey legal norms”
by exercising their “discernment”.((59) The individual is no
longer simply subject “to the law” but participates in its con-
struction. In the rule of law under a democracy, citizens must
be able to think of themselves at all times as “the authors of
the law to which they are subject as beneficiaries”.((60) Not
every state that may seem to have an ordered judicial struc-
ture of sorts, based on something akin to a hierarchy of
norms, qualifies to be called a state with a rule of law.((61)
The idea developed by Hans Kelsen, according to which
any state based on a legal system could be deemed a state
with a rule of law, crumbles in the face of totalitarian logic.
After all, Nazism boasted of a form of rule of law, as did the
Stalinist regimes that enshrined a “socialist rule of law” in
their constitutions.((62) According to them, law is an instru-
ment of action serving the powers that be and is regarded in
a way that is diametrically opposed to liberal logic. The
norm is no longer distanced from the authorities’ whims and
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The norms of Chinese harmony
a lack of hierarchy of norms only magnifies this closeness,
ruling out any attempt at jurisdictional control.((63)
Socialist harmony derives thus from both ideological and
utopian urges. Its institutionalisation helps the regime pre-
serve itself and also renew itself through association with a
proposal that is presented as original but is actually illusory.
Utopia implies a semantic shift from the realm of the possi-
ble to that of the imaginary. Paul Ricoeur has ably illustrated
the role played by the imaginary, the building of a different
society. Indeed, “doesn’t the imagination of another society
that is found nowhere, enable the most fantastic challenge to
what exists?”((64) Meanwhile, ideology and utopia come to-
gether in the domain of power and authority. Utopia’s func-
tion could be to expose “this problem of credibility that
arises where the systems of authority exceed both our confi-
dence in them and our belief in their legitimacy.”((65) Herein
lies the genius of the Chinese authorities. Their political sys-
tem, despite being immutable, appears to undergo constant
renewal through the illusion of a journey to nowhere (ou-
topos), which is timeless (ou-chronos) and invokes a mythi-
cal, reinterpreted China.
The other is Sinicized and reinvented, thus advancing its
uniqueness in order to stay away from politically destabilis-
ing universal values, only leading to conserving an inward-
looking and disillusioned society. The political cynicism that
such a model can spawn is dangerous for China, and also for
the idea of democracy.
This journey, as it were, to the nowhere of today’s China
helps highlight the hidden side of its seemingly democratic
plans, and their inability to spread, by going beyond cultural
relativism. An approach of “the inside looking out and the
outside looking in” is required in order to make contact with
the “expanded humanism” laid out by Louis Dumont.((66)
However, this mutual process should not lead to any renun-
ciation of values that lie at the heart of the social contract of
modern democracies. Too keen an attempt to legitimise the
Chinese model as an original one in order to promote the ac-
ceptance of different and supposedly cultural values some-
times makes one forget the universality that deeply unites all
individuals. The concepts related to the liberal paradigm have
too often become distorted because of the eagerness to keep
persuading people of their relevance. Concepts such as rule
of law or democracy, when seen through the filter of social-
ist harmony, would hardly capture the popular imagination.
But rule of law or democracy in their globalised form, as pro-
moted by international agencies focused on efficiency, also
fail to convince. Globalised positivism can lead only to a form
of disenchantment. Only by going beyond procedural liberal-
ism, with law reduced to a depoliticised and de-individualised
technical tool, can one grasp the democratic idea. This calls
out for rediscovering the essence of a modern natural law, as
conceived by Leo Strauss when he proposes to refer to this
concept to distinguish “legitimate and illegitimate objectives”
and “just and unjust” aspirations.((67)
The Chinese regime has not yet agreed to proceed in this di-
rection. Yet, if one thinks of the way Chinese society has
evolved in dynamic terms, a glimmer of hope appears. The
struggle of the weiquan renshi clearly exemplifies this desire
for justice. Would it not be right to say that the activism of
these defenders of the right of defence signifies evolution, to-
wards a greater freedom to challenge the state authority, albeit
to a limited extent? On 8 August 2007, exactly a year ahead
of the Beijing Olympic Games, a group of more than 40 Chi-
nese intellectuals and activists addressed an ambitious open
letter to the PRC government and the international commu-
nity, calling for an end to human rights violations and the re-
lease of prisoners of conscience. Echoing the regime’s official
slogan for the Games — “One World, One Dream” — the in-
tellectuals sought to have their voice heard by invoking higher
values dear to the human community as a whole. The Beijing
Games slogan was thus expanded, in an unofficial version, to
“One World, One Dream and Universal Human Rights.”((68)
Inserting the individual into the global arena alarms the pow-
ers that be as much as it reinforces their dynamism. The Chi-
nese regime is not a simple authoritarian regime; it contains
the seeds of a dangerous all-embracing paradigm, neatly de-
scribed by Chen Yan as “conscious totalitarianism”.((69)
Chinese citizens have rightly become aware of their individ-
uality both during and through the reforms. Despite being
withdrawn into the One society illusion they pretend to be-
lieve in, they will not forget that they have natural and posi-
tive rights with the potential to guarantee their freedom. •
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